Contents
Acknowledgements 3
Revisions 3
Introduction 4
Cloud Security Landscape 5
Cloud Security Guidance 7
  Step 1: Ensure effective governance, risk and compliance processes exist 8
  Step 2: Audit operational and business processes 11
  Step 3: Manage people, roles and identities 14
  Step 4: Ensure proper protection of data 17
  Step 5: Enforce privacy policies 20
  Step 6: Assess the security provisions for cloud applications 22
  Step 7: Ensure cloud networks and connections are secure 25
  Step 8: Evaluate security controls on physical infrastructure and facilities 31
  Step 9: Manage security terms in the cloud service agreement 32
  Step 10: Understand the security requirements of the exit process 34
Cloud Security Assessment 35
Works Cited 38
Additional References 41
Appendix A: Distinctions Between Security and Privacy 42
Appendix B: Worldwide Privacy Regulations 43
Appendix C: Acronyms & Abbreviations 47
Acknowledgements

The major contributors to this whitepaper and successive version updates are: Claude Baudoin (cébé IT & Knowledge Management), Eric Cohen (PricewaterhouseCoopers), Chris Dotson (IBM), Mike Edwards (IBM), Jonathan Gershater (Trend Micro), David Harris (Boeing), Sreekanth Iyer (IBM), Reddy Karri (Schlumberger), Ryan Kean (The Kroger Co.), Elizabeth Koumpan (IBM), Taiye Lambo (eFortresses), Yves Le Roux (CA Technologies), Shamun Mahmud (GRC Research Associates), Madhava Meduri (Cisco), John Meegan (IBM), Nya Murray (Trac-Car), Barry Pardee (Tailwind Associates), Steven Pogue (IBM), Matt Rutkowski (IBM), Karl Scott (Satori Consulting), Annie Sokol (NIST), Pamela Wise-Martinez (Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation).

Revisions

Much has changed in the realm of cloud security since the Security for Cloud Computing: Ten Steps to Ensure Success, Version 2.0 whitepaper was published in March, 2015. Version 3.0 includes the following updates:

- New worldwide privacy regulations taken into account.
- New and updated standards focused on different aspects of cloud computing security have been added.
- More emphasis given to security logging and monitoring particularly with respect to data activity monitoring.
- The importance of a formal information governance framework highlighted more prominently.
- The standard practice of leveraging key management services to safeguard cryptographic keys has been added.
- The importance of including security in a continuous delivery and deployment approach is explained.
- Managing the identity and access of services in a microservices environment is emphasized.
- References to additional CSCC whitepapers related to cloud security and data residency have been added.
Introduction

Cloud computing offers many benefits to organizations, but these benefits are likely to be undermined by the failure to ensure appropriate information security and privacy protection when using cloud services, resulting in reputational harm, higher costs and potential loss of business.

The aim of this guide is to provide a practical reference to help enterprise information technology (IT) and business decision makers analyze the information security and privacy implications of cloud computing on their business. The paper includes a list of steps, along with guidance and strategies, designed to help decision makers evaluate and compare the security and privacy elements of cloud service offerings from different cloud providers in key areas.

When considering a move to cloud computing, customers must have a clear understanding of potential security benefits and risks associated with cloud computing, and set realistic expectations with their cloud service providers. Consideration must be given to the different service categories - Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) - as each model brings different security requirements and responsibilities. Additionally, this paper highlights the role that standards play to improve cloud security and privacy and it also identifies areas where future standardization could be effective.

The section titled “Cloud Security Landscape” provides an overview of the security and privacy challenges relevant to cloud computing and points out considerations that organizations should weigh when migrating data, applications, and infrastructure to a cloud computing environment.

The section titled “Cloud Security Guidance” is the heart of the guide and includes the steps that can be used as a basis for evaluating cloud provider security and privacy. It discusses the threats, technology risks, and safeguards for cloud computing environments, and provides the insight needed to make informed IT decisions on their treatment. Although guidance is provided, each organization must perform its own analysis of its needs and assess, select, engage, and oversee the cloud services that can best fulfill those needs.

The section titled “Cloud Security Assessment” provides customers with an efficient method of assessing the security and privacy capabilities of cloud providers and assessing their individual risks. A questionnaire for customers to conduct their own assessment across each of the critical security and privacy domains is provided.

A related CSCC document, Practical Guide to Cloud Service Agreements [1], provides additional guidance on evaluating security and privacy criteria from prospective cloud providers. The CSCC guide, Cloud Security Standards: What to Expect and What to Negotiate [2], highlights the security standards and certifications that are currently available on the market as well as the cloud-specific security standards that are currently being developed. The CSCC Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on Cloud Services [34] provides more in-depth advice offered for each of the ten steps covered in this guide.
Cloud Security Landscape

While security and privacy concerns, as outlined in Appendix A, are similar across cloud services and traditional non-cloud services, those concerns are amplified for cloud computing by the existence of external control over organizational assets and the potential for mismanagement of those assets. Transitioning to public cloud computing involves a transfer of responsibility and control to the cloud service provider over information as well as system components that were previously under the customer’s direct control.

Despite this inherent loss of control, the cloud service customer still needs to take responsibility for its use of cloud services in order to maintain situational awareness, weigh alternatives, set priorities, and effect changes in security and privacy that are in the best interest of the organization. The customer achieves this by ensuring that the cloud service agreement for each cloud service has appropriate provisions for security and privacy. In particular, the agreement must help maintain legal protections for the privacy of data stored and processed on the provider’s systems. The customer must also ensure appropriate integration of cloud services with their own systems for managing security and privacy.

There is a number of security and privacy risks associated with cloud computing that must be adequately addressed:

- **Loss of governance ownership.** In a public cloud deployment, customers cede control to the cloud service provider over a number of issues that may affect security and privacy. Yet cloud service agreements may not offer a commitment to resolve such issues on the part of the cloud service provider, thus leaving gaps in security defenses.

- **Responsibility ambiguity.** Responsibilities over aspects of security and privacy may be shared between the cloud service provider and the customer, with the potential for vital parts of the defenses to be left unguarded if there is a failure to allocate and delineate responsibilities clearly. The split of responsibilities is likely to vary depending on the cloud service model used (e.g., IaaS vs. SaaS).

- **Authentication and Authorization.** The fact that sensitive cloud resources are accessed from anywhere in cyberspace heightens the need to establish with certainty the identity of a user – especially if users now include employees, contractors, partners, and customers. Strong authentication and authorization becomes a critical concern.

- **Isolation failure.** Multi-tenancy and shared resources are defining characteristics of public cloud deployment. This risk category covers the failure of mechanisms separating the usage of storage, memory, routing and even reputation between tenants.

- **Compliance and legal risks.** The cloud customer’s investment in achieving certification (e.g., to demonstrate compliance with industry standards or regulatory requirements) may be lost if the cloud service provider cannot provide evidence of their own compliance with the relevant

---

requirements. The customer must check that the cloud service provider has appropriate and relevant certifications in place.

- **Handling of security incidents.** The detection, reporting, and subsequent management of security incidents may be delegated to the cloud service provider, but these incidents impact the customer. Notification rules need to be negotiated in the cloud service agreement so that customers are not caught unaware or informed with unacceptable delay.

- **Management interface vulnerability.** Interfaces to manage public cloud resources (such as self-provisioning) are usually accessible through the Internet. Since they allow access to larger sets of resources than traditional hosting providers, they pose an increased risk, especially when combined with remote access and web browser vulnerabilities.

- **Application protection.** Traditionally, applications have been protected with defense-in-depth security solutions based on a clear demarcation of physical and virtual resources, and on trusted zones. With the delegation of infrastructure security responsibility to the cloud service provider, organizations need to rethink perimeter security at the network level, applying more controls at the user, application, and data level. The same level of user access control and protection must be applied to workloads deployed in cloud services as to those running in traditional data centers. This requires creating and managing workload-centric policies as well as implementing centralized management across distributed workload instances.

- **Data protection.** The major concerns are exposure or release of personal data and/or sensitive data, the loss or unavailability of data, and over-retention of data. It may be difficult for the cloud service customer (in the role of data controller) to effectively check the data handling practices of the cloud service provider. This problem is exacerbated in cases of multiple transfers of data, (e.g., between multiple cloud services or where a cloud provider uses subcontractors and third party providers), resulting in a lack of ownership transparency and unclear purposes for the processing of the data.

- **Personal data regulation.** It is common in most jurisdictions that any personal data must be treated according to the requirements of laws and/or regulations. This now commonly extends beyond the protection of such personal data, but also involves rights granted to the data subject to inspect, correct, or delete their data – and in some cases, to request that their data is transferred elsewhere. Any use of a cloud service to hold or process personal data must meet these requirements while at the same time securing the data.

- **Malicious behavior of insiders.** Damage caused by the malicious actions of people working within an organization can be substantial, given the access and authorizations they hold. This is compounded in the cloud computing environment since such activity might occur within either or both the customer organization and the provider organization.

- **Business failure of the provider.** Such failures could render data and applications essential to the customer's business unavailable over an extended period.

- **Service unavailability.** This could be caused by hardware, software, or communication network failures.

- **Vendor lock-in.** Dependency on proprietary services of a particular cloud service provider could lead to the customer being tied to that provider. The lack of portability of applications and data across providers poses a risk of data and service unavailability in case of a change in providers;
therefore it is an important but sometimes overlooked aspect of security. Lack of interoperability of interfaces associated with cloud services also ties the customer to a particular provider and can make it difficult to switch to another provider.

- **Insecure or incomplete data deletion.** The termination of a contract with a provider may not result in deletion of the customer’s data from the provider’s and providers’ third-party systems. Backup copies of data usually exist, and may be mixed on the same media with other customers’ data, making it difficult to selectively erase. The very advantage of multi-tenancy (the sharing of hardware resources) thus represents a higher risk to the customer than dedicated hardware.

- **Visibility and audit.** Some enterprise users are creating a “shadow IT” by procuring cloud services to build IT solutions without explicit organizational approval. Key challenges for the security team are to know about all uses of cloud services within the organization (e.g., what resources are being used, for what purpose, to what extent, and by whom), understand what laws, regulations and policies may apply to such uses, and regularly assess the security aspects of such uses.

Cloud computing does not only create new security and privacy risks, it also provides opportunities to provision improved security services and privacy capabilities that are better than those many organizations implement on their own. Cloud service providers can offer advanced security and privacy capabilities that leverage their scale and their skills at automating infrastructure management tasks, including cloud services offering security capabilities and security tools built into SaaS offerings. This is potentially a boon to customers who have few skilled security personnel.

Another factor in the security and privacy landscape for cloud computing that has emerged more recently is the creation of standards. For example, ISO/IEC 27017 [4] deals with security for public cloud services while the complementary ISO/IEC 27018 standard [5] deals with personal data protection for public cloud services. In addition, the ISO/IEC 19086 series of standards [30] addresses cloud service agreements and SLAs. ISO/IEC 19086 Part 4 [31] deals with security and privacy components of cloud service level agreements. ISO/IEC 27036-4 [43] specifically provides guidance on information security risks associated with the use of cloud services and managing those risks effectively, and responding to risks specific to the acquisition or provision of cloud services. Use of these standards can help customers and providers. There is a growing list of cloud services that have are certified to 27017 and 27018. There is also a growing number of standards that address specific industries, for example, Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) [36] in the healthcare sector.

**Cloud Security Guidance**

As customers transition their applications and data to cloud computing, it is critical for them to maintain or exceed the level of security and privacy protection they had in their traditional IT environment.

This section provides a prescriptive series of steps for cloud service customers to evaluate and manage the security and privacy of their use of cloud services, with the goal of mitigating risk and delivering an appropriate level of support. The following steps will be discussed in detail below:
1. Ensure effective governance, risk and compliance processes exist
2. Audit operational and business processes
3. Manage people, roles and identities
4. Ensure proper protection of data and information
5. Enforce privacy policies
6. Assess the security provisions for cloud applications
7. Ensure cloud networks and connections are secure
8. Evaluate security controls on physical infrastructure and facilities
9. Manage security terms in the cloud service agreement
10. Understand the security requirements of the exit process

Requirements and best practices are highlighted for each step. In addition, each step takes into account the realities of today’s cloud computing landscape and postulates how this space is likely to evolve in the future, including the important role that standards will play.

**Step 1: Ensure effective governance, risk and compliance processes exist**

Most organizations have established security, privacy, and compliance policies and procedures that are used to protect their intellectual property and corporate assets, especially in the IT space. These policies and procedures are developed based upon the analysis of the impact of having these assets compromised. A framework of controls including operating procedures is established to mitigate risk and serve as a benchmark for the execution and validation of compliance. These principles and policies, the enterprise security plan, and the surrounding quality improvement process, constitute the enterprise security governance, risk management, and compliance model.

A formal information governance framework establishes chains of responsibility, authority, and communication. It describes the roles of people involved in the production cycle of content, their responsibilities, the ways in which they interact, and the general rules and policies regarding the production of content.

Good information governance requires specificity and transparency on the legal and regulatory obligations and business value of information. This relates to the people tasked with managing information and establishes measurement, policy, and control mechanisms to enable people to carry out their roles and responsibilities. The ISO/IEC 38500 standard [37] describes guiding principles for governing IT in an organization.
Security and privacy controls for cloud services are similar to those in traditional IT environments. However, the risks may be different because of:

- the sharing of responsibilities between the cloud service customer and the cloud service provider,
- the fact that technical design and operational control of the cloud service is in the hands of the cloud service provider,
- the interface(s) that exist between the cloud service customer and one or more cloud service providers,
- data ownership and data access rights, including intellectual property issues and the access rights that regulators and legal authorities have with regard to data held in cloud services.

It is essential to update security requirements developed for enterprise data centers to produce requirements suitable for the use of cloud services. As part of the transition to cloud computing, it is critical that cloud service customers understand the risks associated with using cloud services and their own level of risk tolerance, and then focus on mitigating the risks that the organization cannot tolerate.

The primary means cloud service customers have to ensure their applications and data hosted in cloud services are secured in accordance with their security and compliance policies is to verify that the cloud service agreement between the customer and the provider, along with associated documents such as the service level agreement (SLA), contain all their requirements. It is vital for the customer to understand all the terms related to security and privacy and to ensure that those terms meet their needs. If a suitable cloud service agreement and SLA are not available, then it is inadvisable for an organization to proceed with the use of those cloud services. Refer to the CSCC Practical Guide to Cloud Service Agreements [1] for details.

The category of cloud service offered by the provider (IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) has a significant impact on the sharing of responsibilities between the customer and the provider to manage security and associated risks. For IaaS, the provider is supplying (and responsible for securing) basic IT resources such as machines, disks, and networks.

The customer is typically responsible for the operating system and the entire software stack necessary to run applications, and is also responsible for the customer data placed into the cloud computing environment. As a result, most of the responsibility for securing the applications and the customer data falls onto the customer. For a PaaS offering, it is likely that much of the software stack is under the control of the cloud service provider, with the application code being the responsibility of the cloud service customer. For SaaS, the infrastructure, software, and data are primarily the responsibility of the provider, since the customer has little control over any of these features. These aspects need appropriate coverage in the contract and the SLA.

It is necessary to be aware that the divisions between these cloud service categories are not always hard, but can be blurred. An example is a PaaS offering that provides the capability for the customer to...
run their own software in a container, alongside other software made available by the provider. The container is more like an IaaS offering, placing much of the responsibility for security and privacy on the customer.

From a general governance perspective, cloud service providers should notify cloud service customers about the occurrence of any security incident in their system, regardless of the parties or data directly impacted. The provider should include specific pertinent information in the notification, resolve the incident as quickly as possible, restore secure access to the service as soon as possible, apply best practice forensics in investigating the circumstances and causes of the incident, and make long-term changes to correct the root causes of the incident to ensure that it does not recur. Due to the high financial and reputation costs resulting from an incident, customers may want the provider to indemnify them if the incident was the provider’s fault. Again, the service level agreement (SLA) and associated documents for use of the cloud service should include details of specific pertinent information and the process.

A fundamental design premise in cloud computing is that, as a customer, your data may be stored in, processed on, and transmitted to any of the servers or devices the cloud service provider operates. In some instances, servers hosting customer data may be located in multiple data centers within different jurisdictions, either because the service provider has multi-jurisdictional operations or has subcontracted services to providers that operate in other jurisdictions. This means that it may be difficult at any particular point in time to know where the customer data actually resides, which regulators have jurisdiction, and what regulations apply. This matters since some regulations, such as the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) [39], restrict the allowable locations for data (data residency). However, it is increasingly the case that cloud service providers provide information about the location(s) of their data centers and provide some degree of control to the customers to choose which of them they use - or don’t use - for any given cloud service.

The jurisdictional issue directly influences the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) and also legal and jurisdictional authority access to this data.2 There is divergence across countries in the laws on investigation and enforcement, including access to encrypted data and investigation of extraterritorial offences. A court can only hear a matter if it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, while governmental agencies can only exercise their powers within their authorized jurisdictions.

Before migrating applications or data to a cloud computing environment, it is important to understand precisely the specific laws or regulations that apply and the relevant duties or obligations imposed on

---

2 The Business Software Alliance (BSA) Global Cloud Computing Scorecard provides an assessment of security and privacy policies that countries are implementing for cloud computing. Refer to http://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2016
both the customer and the provider (e.g., data retention, data protection, interoperability, medical file management, disclosure to authorities). This allows customers to identify the legal issues and the related legal risks, and consequently understand the impact these will have on the applications or data being migrated to cloud services.

One useful approach to the security challenges of cloud computing is for customers to verify that cloud providers are compliant with an established set of security controls. Certification of the provider gives prospective customers more confidence in that provider, and the ability to show “due diligence” in provider selection. Which certification is most appropriate depends to some extent on the category of the cloud service and on the customer’s regional and industry requirements.

**Standards relating to cloud services**

Some organizations provide non industry-specific frameworks for evaluating security controls which can be applied to cloud service providers, including the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), and Holistic Information Security Practitioner Institute (HISPI) which respectively provide the SSAE 16 [6], CoBIT 5 [7] and CAAP [33] frameworks. Other organizations provide frameworks for specific services or industries such as the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) [8].

Groups such as the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) provide guidance which includes a Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM), a provider self-assessment program, Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ), a certification of cloud security knowledge for personnel, Certificate of Cloud Security Knowledge (CCSK), and a registry for cloud service providers to publish the self-assessment results (STAR) [9]. There are also codes of conduct relating to the handling of personal data in cloud services - a particular example is the EU Cloud Code of Conduct [33].

**Step 2: Audit operational and business processes**
Companies understand the importance of auditing the compliance of IT systems, which host their applications and data, to ensure compliance with their corporate, industry or government requirements and policies.

As a baseline, customers should expect to see a report of the cloud service provider’s operations by independent auditors. The level of access to essential audit information is a key consideration of contracts and SLA terms with any cloud service provider. As part of any terms, cloud service providers...
should offer timely access to audit events, log, and report information relevant to a customer’s specific data or applications.

Security tends to be a significant element of any compliance framework. Privacy is commanding much attention in recent years. There are three significant areas where the consideration of security and privacy for cloud computing are of particular interest to cloud service customers and auditors:

1. Understanding the internal control environment of a cloud service provider, including risks, controls, and other governance issues when that environment touches the provision of cloud services.

2. Access to the corporate audit trail, including workflow and authorization, when the audit trail spans cloud services.

3. Assurance of the facilities for management and control of cloud services and how such facilities are secured.

Understanding the internal control environment of a cloud service provider
Using cloud services creates the need for appropriate auditing of the activities of persons employed by the provider, provider’s partners, the customer, or the customer’s partners to ensure that the security controls meet the requirements of the customer. Customers should expect to see audit information relating to any cloud service provider they plan to use. There are several standards that can be used as the basis for auditing a provider, such as the ISO 27000 series. These standards provide the basis for assuring customers that proper controls are in place within the provider organization.

Key controls for cloud services include:

- Ensuring isolation of customer applications and customer data in shared, multi-tenant environments,
- Providing protection of customer assets from unauthorized access by the provider's staff,
- Providing protection of customer assets from the accidental or intentional access by the customer’s employees and partners.

Auditors may be employed by the customer or by the provider, but the key element is that they should be independent. Auditors require access to the policies and procedures of a cloud service provider which relate to security controls. Auditors also require access to logs and records that show whether the policies and procedures are being followed correctly – and, in some cases, the auditors may require specific testing to demonstrate compliance with the prescribed policies and procedures.

Security and authentication technologies, allied to event logging, in the cloud computing environment can help auditors as they deal with issues related to workflow. Were those who entered, approved,
changed or otherwise touched data authorized to do so, on an individual, group or role-related basis? Was that authorization appropriate on a one-time, periodic or ongoing basis?

**Access to the corporate audit trail**

It is vital for cloud service customers to have appropriate access to cloud service provider events, logs, and audit trails that prove enforcement of the provider’s security controls. Auditors need to assure cloud service customers that all the necessary information is being logged and stored appropriately by the cloud service provider, including authentication, authorization, and management information relating to the use of particular applications and data against all security and compliance policies established by the provider or customer.

For complete insight into security controls as they relate to the customer’s applications and data, mechanisms for the routine flow of audit information from the provider to the customer are recommended. This flow may include secure logs and reports sent on an agreed-upon schedule. There should be more timely notification of any exceptional security alerts, events or incidents, and incident management processes should be documented and audited. Any audit data should have the necessary associated information to enable forensic analysis to understand how any particular incident occurred, what assets were compromised, and what policies, procedures, and technologies need to be changed to prevent recurrence, along with any additional security controls that need to be established.³

Ideally, there should be automated, standards-based access (through APIs or Web services) to all of these audit facilities, to ensure timely availability of required data and to remove the costs associated with human processing of requests for information. Through these interfaces, customers should be able to track and record all the cloud API calls by their users and applications to the cloud environment. This is essential not only for audit, but also for implementing secure monitoring and intelligence. The audit data itself should be encrypted to avoid the chance of eavesdropping.

**Assurance of the facilities for management and control of cloud services**

In addition to the cloud services themselves, providers generally provide customers with self-service facilities to manage and monitor the usage of their cloud services and associated assets. These facilities may include service catalogs, subscription services, payment processes, the provision of streams of operational event data and logs, usage metering data, facilities for configuring services including the addition and removal of user identities and the management of authorizations.

These facilities are often more sensitive in security terms than the services and applications to which they apply, since the potential for abuse and damage may be higher. A security audit must extend to these facilities as well as to the main services of the provider.

³ The DMTF Cloud Audit Data Federation (CADF) Workgroup [10] has developed an audit event data model and a compatible interaction model that describes interactions between IT resources suitable for cloud deployment models.
Auditing is essential
The security audit of cloud service providers is an essential aspect of the security considerations for cloud service customers, typically as part of a certification process. Audits should be carried out by appropriately skilled staff typically belonging to an independent auditing organization. Security audits should be carried out on the basis of one of the established standards for security controls. Customers need to check that the sets of controls in place meet their security requirements.

There is also a need to ensure proper integration of the cloud service provider’s reporting and logging facilities with the customer’s systems, so that appropriate operational and business data flows on a timely basis to enable customers to manage their use of cloud services.

Step 3: Manage people, roles and identities
The use of a cloud solution means that there will be employees of the provider with the ability to access the customer’s data and applications, as well as employees of the customer who need to perform operations on the provider’s systems.

Customers must ensure that the cloud service provider has processes and functionality that govern who has access to the customer’s data and applications. Conversely, cloud service providers must allow the customer to assign and manage the roles and associated levels of authorization for each of their users in accordance with their security policies, and apply the principle of least privilege. These roles and authorization rights are applied on a per-resource, service or application basis. For example, a cloud service customer, in accordance with its security policies, may have an employee whose role allows the generation of purchase requests, but a different role and authorization rights is granted to another employee responsible for approving the request.

The cloud service provider must have a secure system for provisioning and managing unique identities for their users and services. This Identity and Access Management (IdAM) functionality must support simple resource access and robust customer application and service workflows. Any user access to the provider’s management platform, regardless of role or entitlement, should be monitored and logged to provide auditing of all access to customer data and applications.

Identity Management serves to secure access privileges not only for end users of applications, but also for privileged access by administrators, developers, and testers. All major public cloud service providers have the same concepts for Identity Management, however, the security implementation details differ from provider to provider. Best practice is to use a Key Management Service to safeguard cryptographic keys, passwords, and secrets used by cloud IdAM services. Multi Factor Authentication (MFA), such as a security token assigned to the user’s device (hardware or virtual), authenticator applications, or SMS text message is now standard practice. SMS text message-based should be avoided due to vulnerabilities in the public telephone network Signaling System 7 protocol.
Table 1 highlights the key features a cloud service provider should support in order to effectively manage people, roles and identities for cloud services. Additional insight is provided in the Identity and Access Management section of the CSCC *Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on Cloud Services* whitepaper [34].

Table 1. Cloud service provider support for people, roles and identities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Capabilities</th>
<th>Customer Considerations and Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federated Identity Management (FIM), External Identity Providers (EIP)</strong></td>
<td>Enterprises that are cloud service customers may already have an existing IdAM system. If so, it is highly recommended that they leverage it for cloud services and do not replicate user identities in a separate system for each cloud service. This is not only more efficient, it is also more secure because some functions, such as removing users from the cloud service when users leave the organization, happen automatically. <strong>Question to cloud service provider</strong>: Can I integrate my current IdAM system with your cloud services?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity Provisioning and Delegation</strong></td>
<td>Customer organizations need to administer their own users. The cloud provider should support delegated administration.                                                                                                          <strong>Question to cloud service provider</strong>: If I cannot use my current IdAM system, what tools do you provide for onboarding and offboarding users? <strong>Question to cloud service provider</strong>: Does your platform offer delegated administration for my organization to administer users?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Sign-On (SSO), Single Sign-Off</strong></td>
<td>Customer organizations may wish to federate identity across applications to provide single sign-on (SSO) along with single sign-off to assure user sessions get terminated properly. For example, an organization using separate SaaS applications for CRM and ERP may require single sign-on, sign-off, and authorization across these applications (using standards such as SAML 2.0 [11], WS-Federation [12] and OAuth [13]). <strong>Question to cloud service provider</strong>: Do you offer single sign-on for access across multiple applications you offer, or trusted federated single sign-on across applications with other vendors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider Capabilities</td>
<td>Customer Considerations and Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Identity and Access Audit     | Customers need auditing and logging reports relating to service usage for their own assurance as well as compliance with regulations.  
**Question to cloud service provider:** What auditing logs, reports, alerts and notifications do you provide in order to monitor user access both for my needs and for the needs of my auditor?  
**Question to cloud service provider:** What capability do you provide to facilitate privileged access reviews? |
| Robust Authentication         | For access to high value assets hosted in cloud services, customers may require that their provider support strong, multi-factor, mutual and/or biometric authentication.  
**Question to cloud service provider:** What forms of strong authentication does your platform support?  
**Question to cloud service provider:** Does strong authentication apply to both provider administrative roles and customer access? |
| Role, Entitlement and Policy Management | Cloud service customers need to be able to describe and enforce their security policies, user roles, groups, and entitlements to their business and operational applications and assets with due consideration for any industry, regional, or corporate requirements.  
**Question to cloud service provider:** Does your platform offer fine-grained access control to enable segregation of duties? |
| Service ID and API Keys        | With the cloud native microservices approach, cloud service customers also need to manage the identity and access of services. This is typically done through use of the service ID which is an identity that can be used by an application or service. The developer can also create and associate API keys with the service ID which is used to authenticate and access other services based on the policy and permissions set.  
**Question to cloud service provider:** Does your platform support the notion of Service ID and use of API Keys? |
Cloud service providers should have formalized processes for managing their own employee access to resources used to store, transmit, or execute customer data and applications. Providers should be able to disclose and demonstrate the effectiveness of these processes to the customer.

**Step 4: Ensure proper protection of data**

Data is a critical business asset and is at the core of IT security concerns for any organization, regardless of the form of infrastructure that is used. Cloud computing does not change this, but brings new challenges because of the distributed nature of the cloud computing services and the shared responsibilities that it involves. Security considerations apply both to data at rest (held on some form of storage system) and also to *data in transit* (being transferred over some form of communication link), both of which may need particular consideration when using cloud services.

Essentially, the questions relating to data for cloud computing are about various forms of risk: risk of theft or unauthorized disclosure of data, risk of tampering or unauthorized modification of data, risk of loss or of unavailability of data, risk of keeping data longer than it is needed. In the cloud, “data assets” may also include application programs or machine images, which can present the same risks as the contents of databases or data files.

The general approaches to the security of data are described in specifications, such as the ISO/IEC 27002 [44] standard, and these control-oriented approaches apply to the use of cloud services with some additional cloud-specific considerations as described in the ISO/IEC 27017 standard. Security controls described in ISO/IEC 27002 highlight the general features that need to be addressed and to which specific techniques can then be applied.

The category of the cloud service is very likely to affect who is responsible for handling particular security controls.

- For IaaS, more responsibility is likely to be with the customer (e.g., for encrypting data stored on a cloud storage device).
- For SaaS, more responsibility is likely to be with the provider, since neither the stored data nor the application code is directly visible or controllable by the customer.
- PaaS cloud services present unique challenges in that responsibility is likely shared between the customer and provider. It is important to understand how each service being utilized within the PaaS environment handles data security, including encryption as well as log file handling and administrative access. The customer needs to know what obligations it retains and the available features and configuration of the PaaS service that can facilitate data security.

Table 2 highlights the key steps customers should take to ensure that data involved in cloud computing activities is properly secure.
Table 2. Controls for securing data in cloud computing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controls</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create a data asset catalog</td>
<td>● Identify all data assets, classifying them in terms of criticality to the business (which can involve financial and legal considerations, including compliance requirements), specifying ownership and responsibility for the data, and describing the location(s) and acceptable use of the assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Relationships between data assets also need to be cataloged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● A strong understanding of sensitive data flow is needed. This includes identification of permanent (e.g., database) and temporary (e.g., cache - Content Delivery Network) storage of sensitive data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● An associated aspect is the description of responsible parties and roles, which in the case of cloud computing must span the cloud service customer organization and the cloud service provider organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider all forms of data</td>
<td>● Organizations are increasing the amount of unstructured data held in IT systems, which can include items such as images of scanned documents, pictures and multimedia files.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Unstructured data can be sensitive and require specific treatment - for example, redaction or masking of personal information such as signatures, addresses, or license plates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● For structured data, in a multi-tenant cloud environment, data held in databases needs consideration. Database segmentation can be offered in a couple of varieties: shared or isolated data schema.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o In a shared data schema, each customer's data is intermixed within the same database. This means that customer A's data may reside in row 1 while customer B's data resides in row 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o In an isolated architecture, the customer's data is segregated into its own database instance. While this may provide additional isolation, it also impacts the providers' economies of scale and could, potentially, increase the cost to the customer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o In either scenario, database encryption should be employed to protect all data at rest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Consider privacy requirements | - Data privacy often involves laws and regulations relating to the acquisition, storage and use of personally identifiable information (PII).  
- Typically, privacy implies limitations on the use and accessibility of PII, with associated requirements to tag the data appropriately, to store it securely, to permit access only by appropriately authorized users, and to delete it within a specified period of time.  
- This requires appropriate controls, particularly when the data is stored within a cloud provider’s infrastructure. The ISO/IEC 27018 standard addresses the controls required for PII. These controls may restrict the geographical location in which the data is stored, for example, which runs counter to one aspect of cloud computing which is that cloud computing resources can be distributed in multiple locations for load balancing or cost reduction. |
| Apply confidentiality, integrity and availability procedures | - The key security principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability are applied to the handling of the data through the application of a set of policies and procedures which should reflect the classification of the data.  
- Sensitive data should be encrypted, both at rest and also when the data is in transit across a network, for example, between storage and processing, or between the provider's system and a customer system. The standard, ISO/IEC 19941, addresses controls required for data portability.  
  - Key management is an important consideration when protecting data.  
    Where are the keys stored and how are they made available to application code that needs to decrypt the data for processing?  
    Understand the provider’s key management process to ensure that keys are properly protected.  
- Integrity of data can be validated using techniques such as message digests or secure hash algorithms, allied to data duplication, redundancy and backups.  
- Availability can be addressed through backups, continuous data protection, and resilient systems. There is also a need for a recovery strategy, either by using a service provider who offers this as part of their service offering, or if the provider does not offer resiliency as a feature of their services, the customer may consider self-provision of failover by having equivalent services on standby with another provider or on-premises.  
- Denial of service (DoS) attacks can impact the availability of services. Providers typically deliver services to thwart network-based denial of service attacks. Understand the level of DoS protection available from the provider and plan accordingly. |
### Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ● Security logging and security event management (e.g., the reporting of any security breaches) is needed to monitor activities taking place in the cloud service provider environment.  
● Following this is the need for a clear set of procedures relating to data forensics in the event of a security incident. Note that logs and reporting mechanisms also need appropriate security treatment to prevent an attacker from being able to cover their tracks. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ● Regulatory requirements and/or organizational policies require data usage or access monitoring and auditing.  
● Activity monitoring should include data access (who is accessing the data and what they are doing with the data?), data change, data copy, data file name change, file classification changes, or data ownership changes.  
● Data monitoring should allow for the definition of thresholds and rules that constitute normal activity, and alert the data owner if data activity exceeds the norm.  
● Data owners and/or their representatives should review audit logs periodically and take appropriate action (e.g., change edit access to read-only or terminate access if no longer required for a person or group). |

Most of the security techniques involved are not new, though cloud computing can create new considerations. Cloud provider implementation and maintenance of effective security controls becomes a critical consideration when ensuring the protection of data in cloud services. Data isolation, encryption, and access control is needed to maintain confidentiality. Robust back-up services and resiliency capability is needed to maintain availability. Customers must understand their responsibility to protect data in cloud services and plan accordingly.

The **CSCC Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on Cloud Services** [34] provides additional guidance on the protection of data at rest and data in motion in a cloud environment.

If the customer has interoperability requirements between on premise to cloud or multiple cloud systems, review the standard **ISO/IEC 19941 Cloud Computing - Interoperability and Portability** [38].

### Step 5: Enforce privacy policies

Privacy and protection of personally identifiable information (PII) is gaining importance across the globe, often involving laws and regulations relating to the acquisition, storage, and use of PII. The concern for privacy is heightened by newsworthy cases in which major companies and financial institutions suffered data breaches involving theft of critical PII such as credit card numbers. Appendix B provides an overview of data protection regulations that currently exist around the world.
While security and privacy are related, they are distinct concerns. Security is primarily concerned with defending against attacks, not all of which are aimed at stealing data, while privacy is specifically related to personal data held by an organization, which may be endangered by negligence or software bugs, not necessarily by malevolent persons. Handling of PII may also involve positive rights granted to the persons whose personal data is held and processed by the organization. Appendix A further analyzes those distinctions.

Typically, data protection requires imposing limitations on the use and accessibility of PII, based on policies that are written by non-IT personnel, especially the Legal and Risk Management departments, which are consistent with applicable regulations and laws, and are approved at the highest levels of the organization. Enforcement of such limitations implies requirements to tag the data appropriately, store it securely, and permit access only by authorized users. This requires appropriate controls, which can be more challenging when the data is stored in cloud services. The ISO/IEC 27018 standard addresses the controls required for the protection of PII.

When data is placed in or transferred to a cloud computing environment, the ultimate responsibility for protecting and securing the data typically remains with the customer (the data controller in EU terminology⁴), even if in some circumstances this responsibility may be shared with others. When an organization relies on a third party to host or process its data (the data processor), the data controller may remain liable for any loss, damage, or misuse of the data, while the data processor may need to appoint a Data Protection Officer if certain criteria are met. The rules for data processors are stricter in the European Union under the GDPR [39]. It is prudent, and may be legally required, that the data controller and the cloud service provider enter into a written (legal) agreement that clearly defines the roles and expectations of the parties, allocates between them the many responsibilities that are attached to the data at stake, and specifies under which circumstances the cloud customer indemnifies the provider for any losses or damages sustained, or vice versa.

It is critical that privacy requirements be adequately addressed in the cloud service agreement. If not, the cloud service customer should consider seeking a different provider or not placing sensitive data in the cloud service. For example, customers that wish to place health information subject to the United States HIPAA regulation [14] into a cloud service must find a cloud service provider that will sign a HIPAA business associate agreement.

Certain technologies may be used to reduce the risk of disclosing PII to unauthorized parties while allowing the customer to gain the benefits of a cloud solution. For example, data may be anonymized before being stored in the cloud service, while the small amount of critical information required to match the anonymous records with the real people they represent is held in a separate database kept on premises.

Privacy regulations such as the EU GDPR [39] and standards such as ISO/IEC 29100 and ISO/IEC 27018 place requirements on the data controller to provide access for data subjects ("PII principals" in the ISO standards) to their PII. Data subjects may also have a right to obtain their PII in a "commonly used and machine readable format" (EU GDPR [39]). These access rights require appropriate capabilities to be provided by a cloud service used to store and process personal data - and these capabilities present a significant set of security issues all of their own. For example, how does the data controller authenticate the data subject to ensure that personal data is only made available to the data subject to which it relates (i.e., how to prevent a data breach where someone is able to access someone else’s personal data)?

Enterprises are responsible for defining policies to address privacy concerns and raise awareness of data protection within their organization. They are also responsible for ensuring that their cloud service providers adhere to the defined privacy policies. Thus, customers have an ongoing obligation to monitor their provider’s compliance with customer policies. This includes an audit program covering all aspects of the privacy policies, including methods of ensuring that corrective actions will take place.

**Step 6: Assess the security provisions for cloud applications**

Organizations need to proactively protect their business-critical applications from external and internal threats throughout their entire life cycle, from design to implementation to production. Clearly defined security policies and processes are essential to ensure the applications are enabling the business rather than introducing additional risk.

Application security poses specific challenges to both the cloud service provider and the customer. Organizations must apply the same diligence to application security as they do to physical and infrastructure security. If an application is compromised, it can create financial liability and reputation damage to both the provider and the customer, especially if the ultimate end users of the application are customers of the customer rather than its employees.

In order to protect an application from various types of breaches it is important to understand the application security policy considerations based on the different cloud deployment models. Table 3 highlights the impact of cloud deployment on application security. All of these considerations are in addition to the others outlined in this whitepaper (facilities, network, data, etc.).
Table 3. Deployment model impact on application security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Type</th>
<th>Application Security Policy Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) | - The customer has responsibility for deployment of the complete software stack - operating system, middleware and application - and for all aspects of security that relate to this stack, including the application of all appropriate security patches.  
  - The application security policy should closely mimic the policy of applications hosted internally by the customer. In addition, it should consider adaptation in security operations that are required because of the shared responsibility nature of cloud services.  
  - The customer should develop and regularly test incident response procedures that are based on the shared responsibilities between customer and cloud service provider.  
  - The customer should focus on network, physical environment, auditing, authorization, and authentication considerations as outlined in this document.  
  - Appropriate data encryption standards should be applied in the handling of data and to user interaction (e.g., secure browsing) by the application.  
  - System assurance principles and development and testing methods that minimize the risk of introducing vulnerabilities into the code should be applied even more rigorously than for an on premises application since the application will reside outside of the customer’s security perimeter.  
  - If hardware-based trusted computing security measures based on ISO 11889:2015 [40] ("TPM 2.0"), such as Intel TXT are available, consider using them to block rootkits and other hard-to-detect malware. |
| Platform as a Service (PaaS)     | - The customer should identify potential threats and their impact should they occur, in addition to how to respond to the potential threats.  
  - The customer should request regular security reports from its cloud vendor and ensure understanding of how the data is protected.  
  - The customer has responsibility for application deployment and for securing access to the application itself.  
  - The provider has responsibility for properly securing the infrastructure, operating system, and middleware.  
  - The customer should focus on audit, authorization, and authentication considerations as outlined in this document.  
  - Appropriate data encryption and key management standards should be applied.  
  - The customer needs to define how sensitive data, as part of their data classification, is handled in general and by configuration options provided by utilized PaaS services.  
  - In a PaaS model, the customer may or may not have knowledge of the format and location of their data. It is important that they are knowledgeable of how their data may be accessed by individuals with administrative access. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Type</th>
<th>Application Security Policy Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Software as a Service (SaaS)    | ● Application-tier security policy controls are mostly the responsibility of the provider and are dependent upon terms in the contract and SLA. The customer must ensure that these terms meet their confidentiality, integrity, and availability requirements.  
● It is important to understand the provider’s patching schedule, controls against malware, and release cycle. 
● Scaling policies help deal with fluctuating loads placed on the application. Scaling policies are based on resources, users, and data requests.  
● Typically, the customer is only able to modify parameters of the application that have been exposed by the provider. These parameters are likely independent of application security configurations, however, the customer should ensure that their configuration changes augment, not inhibit, the provider’s security model.  
● The customer should have knowledge of how their data is protected against administrative access by the provider. In a SaaS model, the customer will likely not be aware of the location and format of the data storage.  
● The customer must understand the data encryption standards which are applied to data at rest and in motion.  
● The customer needs to be aware of how sensitive data, as defined in their data classification, is being handled in general and by configuration options. |

It should be noted that there is a cost to the customer to ensure that these considerations are applied. The costs are typically built into technology, resources, interventions, and audits. However, these costs will likely pale in comparison with the potential liability and loss of reputation from an application security breach.

When developing and deploying applications in a cloud environment, it is critical that customers realize that they may forfeit some control and should design their cloud applications with these considerations in mind. Additionally, it is critical that customers and providers developing application software use a structured methodology to engineer security into their cloud applications from the ground up. Secure engineering for applications is dealt with at length by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [41] and by the ISO/IEC 27034 series of standards [42].

For cloud services, development and operations teams come together as Dev-Ops. Cloud infrastructures, cloud platforms, and cloud applications should be engineered to address the threats found within the operational environment. Security must be incorporated into this continuous delivery and deployment approach as Sec-Dev-Ops or Dev-Sec-Ops to ensure the application runs on a safe platform, the code is free from vulnerabilities, and the operational risks are clearly understood.
This includes:

- Secure engineering to ensure the products and services are developed and built with appropriate security and privacy controls and operate in compliance with accepted international, national, governmental, industry, and regional security standards.
- Secure deployment and operations to ensure that cloud platform, runtimes, and applications are deployed securely, checked regularly for security configuration and hygiene, tested for security vulnerabilities, and updated with software patches and security fixes.
- Separation of duties to ensure that users only have the access that is required to perform their jobs according to the principle of least privilege.
- Availability and business continuity management to ensure that infrastructure, runtime components, and management components are highly available.
- Security evaluation and learning to ensure that the security functions and properties in the delivered code and services are maintained as threats evolve and new vulnerabilities arise.

Automating most of the above security steps as part of the Dev-Ops process is key to enabling continuous development and deployment of services and offerings on the cloud. However, an automated static code analysis tool is no substitute for appropriate security engineering analysis and practice, and a strong developer peer review process should also be documented and published.

The focus of secure coding includes:

- Applying appropriate endpoint protection and API security
- Input validation
- Output encoding
- Session management
- Credential and password handling
- Protection of sensitive data in storage and in motion
- Error handling and logging
- Protection of log information
- Selection and proper use of APIs and network services

There are general secure coding practices guidelines available to help educate developers including the OWASP Secure Coding Practices [41].

**Step 7: Ensure cloud networks and connections are secure**

A cloud service provider must allow legitimate network traffic and block malicious network traffic, just as any other Internet-connected organization does. However, unlike traditional IT service organizations, a cloud service provider will not necessarily know what network traffic its customers plan to send and receive. Nevertheless, customers should expect some external network perimeter safety measures from
their cloud service providers. Providers should also give customers the tools necessary to segment and protect their systems.

To use the analogy of a hotel, we expect the hotel to provide some limited amount of perimeter security - not allowing anyone into the building without a key card during certain times of night, for example, or challenging obviously dangerous persons - even though we should not expect the hotel to deny access to every potentially dangerous person. We also expect the hotel to provide door locks that are effective if the customers use them.

With this in mind, it is recommended that customers evaluate the external network controls of a cloud service provider based on the areas highlighted in Table 4.

**Table 4. External network requirements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Responsibility</th>
<th>Description / Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Traffic screening       | • Certain traffic is almost never legitimate – for example, traffic to known malware ports. If the cloud provider does not automatically screen traffic, the cloud customer should do so.  
• Screening is generally performed by firewall devices or software. Some considerations:  
  o Does the provider publish a standard perimeter block list that aligns with the terms of service for the offering? If so, customers should request a copy of the block list; a reasonable block list can provide a customer with both assurance of a network protection plan as well as some functional guidelines on what is allowed. There may be some cause for concern if the block list is not in line with the terms of service.  
  o Does the provider's firewall control IPv6 access, or protect against both IPv4 and IPv6 attacks? More and more devices are IPv6 capable, and some providers forget to limit IPv6 access, which can allow an attacker an easy way around the IPv4 firewall.  
  o Does the provider offer any geographic restrictions? Traffic from some geographic areas may be prohibited by local laws or may be more likely to be fraudulent. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Responsibility</th>
<th>Description / Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Denial-of-service protection | • Is the provider able to withstand and adapt to high-traffic attacks, such as Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks? DDOS attacks are commonly used for extortion purposes, and the ability of a cloud service provider and its Internet service provider to assist in blocking the unwanted traffic can be crucial to withstanding an attack.  
• If the solution deployed in the cloud is accessed by the customer’s customers, a DDOS attack against the cloud service provider may result in loss of business for the customer. |
| Intrusion detection and prevention | • Some traffic may initially look legitimate, but deeper inspection indicates that it is carrying malicious payload such as spam, viruses, or known attacks. The customer must understand whether the provider will block or notify the customer about this traffic.  
• Intrusion detection and/or prevention systems (IDS/IPS) may be virtual or real devices. While a firewall usually only makes decisions based on source/destination, ports, and existing connections, an IDS/IPS looks at overall traffic patterns as well as the actual contents of the messages. Many firewalls now include IDS/IPS capabilities.  
• Although technically not IDS/IPS devices, application-level proxies (such as email gateways) will often perform similar functions for certain types of network traffic.  
• An IDS will typically only flag potential problems for human review; an IPS will take action to block the offending traffic automatically. Some IDS/IPS considerations:  
  o IDS/IPS content matching can detect or block known malware attacks, virus signatures, and spam signatures, but are also subject to false positives. If the cloud service provider provides IDS/IPS services, is there a documented exception process for allowing legitimate traffic that has content similar to malware attacks or spam?  
  o Similarly, IDS/IPS traffic pattern analysis can often detect or block attacks such as a denial-of-service attack or a network scan. However, in some cases this is legitimate traffic (such as using cloud infrastructure for load testing or security testing). Does the cloud service provider have a documented exception process for allowing legitimate traffic that the IDS/IPS flags as an attack pattern? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Responsibility</th>
<th>Description / Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Logging and notification| ● For assurance purposes and troubleshooting, it's important that customers have some visibility into network health.  
● Incident reporting and incident handling procedures must be clear and the customer should look for visibility into the handling process. Note that if any Personally Identifiable Information is stored in the cloud computing environment, there may be legal requirements associated with logging data (limiting what can be stored in logs, for example).  
● Some network logging information is of a sensitive nature and may reveal information about other clients, so a cloud provider may not allow direct access to this information. However, it is recommended that customers ask certain questions about logging and notification policies:  
  ○ What is the network logging and retention policy? In the event of a successful attack, the customer may want to perform forensic analysis, and the network logs can be very helpful.  
  ○ What are the notification policies? As a cloud customer, you should be notified in timely manner if your machines are attacked or if they are compromised and are attacking someone else.  
  ○ Are historical statistics available on the number of attacks detected and blocked? These statistics can help a customer understand how effective the provider's detection and blocking capabilities actually are. |

A cloud environment includes a number of resources that are not shared in a traditional data center. One of these resources is the cloud service provider's internal network infrastructure, such as the access switches and routers used to connect cloud virtual machines to the provider’s backbone network.

Internal network security differs from external network security in that we assume that any attackers have already made it through the external defenses, either via an attack or, more commonly, because the attackers are legitimately authorized for a different part of the network. After a user is allowed access to a portion of the cloud service provider’s network, the provider has a number of additional responsibilities with respect to internal network security. To extend the hotel analogy, the room locks and walls must also be sufficient to protect the customers.

The primary categories of internal network attacks that customers should be concerned with include:

1. Confidentiality breaches (disclosure of confidential data)  
2. Integrity breaches (unauthorized modification of data)  
3. Availability breaches (denial of service, either intentional or unintentional)
Customers must evaluate the cloud service provider’s internal network controls with respect to their requirements. Each customer’s requirements will be different, but it is recommended that customers evaluate the internal network controls of a service provider based on the areas highlighted in Table 5.

Table 5. Internal network requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Responsibility</th>
<th>Description / Guidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide tools to protect customers from one another</td>
<td>Cloud service providers are responsible for providing ways for customers to separate themselves from other customers and from the Internet. Most cloud service providers will provide one or more of the following technologies for this purpose:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Virtual LANs, or VLANs, are a technology that places systems on separate virtual Ethernet switches. In theory, network traffic on one VLAN cannot be seen on a different VLAN any more than network traffic on one physical Ethernet switch can be seen on a different, non-connected Ethernet switch.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLAN separation technology is often a primary control for cloud providers and is generally very effective. However, there are documented “VLAN hopping” attacks that allow unauthorized traffic between VLANs, such as “double-tagging” and “switch spoofing.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most VLAN technologies allow all systems on the same VLAN to talk with no restrictions, and only prevent communication between systems on different VLANs. Advanced VLAN and firewall technologies may be able to prevent communications on a more granular level, from system to system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many cloud service providers offer private VLANs for customers that no other customers should be able to access. These VLANs may be implemented on physical switches, hypervisors, or a combination of both. When implemented on hypervisors, this technology is often called “Virtual Private Cloud.” It is recommended that customers verify that the provider’s VLAN controls address known VLAN hopping attacks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs, and also sometimes referred to simply as “tunnels”) can be used to connect a customer’s dedicated cloud VLAN back to the customer’s network; this configuration is commonly known as a “site-to-site” VPN.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPNs can also be used to allow roaming users anywhere on the Internet to securely access the customer’s VLAN; this configuration is commonly called “client-to-site”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In both cases, there are multiple technologies (such as SSL and IPSec) with...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider Responsibility</td>
<td>Description / Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>different security implementations (such as certificate/credential based or endpoint authentication).</strong> VPNs offer another layer of security, and may sometimes be the only layer of security for protocols without built in security (such as FTP). It is recommended that customers decide whether VPNs are required to protect the data being transmitted, and if so, ensure that the cloud provider supports the required operating mode (client-to-site or site-to-site) and implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3. Firewalls block IP traffic on the network.</strong> One typical implementation is an “infrastructure” firewall, which is a separate system that sits between segments and blocks traffic flowing through the firewall. Other common implementations are host based or hypervisor based firewalls, which only controls traffic coming in and out of the instance; some implementations of this type of control are called “security groups.” Both implementations can be used simultaneously. Host-based firewalls can allow for greater control of traffic between network segments, but can be more difficult to manage on larger scales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If using a cloud provider’s images, customers should ensure that the images contain proper software firewall capabilities and that the rules are simple to deploy and modify. Per-instance firewalls are particularly important if sharing a network segment with other customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4. Hypervisor based filters, such as ebttables on Linux, are functionally similar to VLANs and firewalls in that they can prohibit or allow communications at the “virtual switch” level. However, these can also be used to prevent attacks such as IP and MAC address spoofing. If dedicated VLANs are not used, it is recommended that the customer ask what protections are in place to prevent another customer’s instance from masquerading as one of your instances.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide tools to allow customers to implement network segmentation</td>
<td><strong>• The provider should allow customers to create multiple layers of network security within the deployment, such as the creation of a “demilitarized zone” or DMZ, and multiple back-end network zones for different types of systems.</strong> For example, a customer may want to create:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ two different DMZ network segments for production and test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ separate back end segments for production and test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ a separate administration segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider Responsibility</td>
<td>Description / Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Protect the provider's network | ● The client separation strategies above are worthless if the provider's control network is not properly protected. An attacker who gains access to the provider's control network may be able to perform attacks on other customers from the control network.  
● Customers should ask what security controls are in place for the cloud infrastructure itself. While many cloud providers will not give out in-depth details of their security measures due to valid security concerns, there should be a stated security policy and some assurance (e.g., via audit and certification) that it is followed. |
| Monitor for intrusion attempts | ● Activity auditing and logging are an important part of preventive security measures as well as incident response and forensics. Audit information and logs should be subject to appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized access, destruction, or tampering.  
● Customers should ask what types of internal network security incidents have been reported and if there are any published statistics or metrics.  
● Customers should also ask for the provider's processes for alerting customers about both successful and unsuccessful internal network attacks. |

**Step 8: Evaluate security controls on physical infrastructure and facilities**

The security of an IT system also depends on the security of the physical infrastructure and facilities. In the case of cloud computing, this extends to the infrastructure and facilities of the cloud service provider. The customer must get assurance from the provider that appropriate security controls are in place.

Assurance may be provided by means of audit and assessment reports, demonstrating compliance to such security standards as ISO/IEC 27002. The security controls include:

- **Physical Infrastructure and facilities should be held in secure areas.** A physical security perimeter should be in place to prevent unauthorized access, allied to physical entry controls to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to areas containing sensitive infrastructure. Appropriate physical security should be in place for all offices, rooms, and facilities that contain physical infrastructure relevant to the provision of cloud services.

- **Protection against external and environmental threats.** Protection should be provided against fire, floods, lightning, earthquakes, civil unrest or other potential threats that could disrupt cloud services.
● **Control of personnel working in secure areas.** Controls should be applied to prevent malicious actions by any personnel who have access to secure areas.

● **Equipment security controls.** Controls should be in place to prevent loss, theft, damage or compromise of assets.

● **Supporting utilities such as electricity supply, gas supply, telecommunications, and water supply should have controls in place.** Controls are required to prevent disruption to cloud services either by failure of a utility supply or by malfunction (e.g., water leakage). This may require the use of multiple routes and multiple utility suppliers.

● **Control security of cabling.** In particular, controls are needed to protect power cabling and telecommunications cabling to prevent accidental or malicious damage.

● **Proper equipment maintenance.** Controls should be in place to perform necessary preventive maintenance of all equipment to ensure that services are not disrupted through foreseeable equipment failures.

● **Control of removal of assets.** Controls are required on the removal of assets to avoid theft of valuable and sensitive assets.

● **Secure disposal or reuse of equipment.** Controls are required for the disposal of any equipment and particularly any devices which might contain data such as storage media.

● **Human resources security.** Appropriate controls need to be in place for the staff working at the facilities of a cloud service provider, including any temporary or contract staff.

● **Backup, Redundancy and Continuity Plans.** The provider should have appropriate backup of data, redundancy of equipment, and continuity plans for handling equipment failure situations.

Effective physical security requires a centralized management system that allows for correlation of inputs from various sources, including property, employees, customers, the general public, and local and regional weather. For more detail on the controls and considerations that apply to each of these items, refer to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard.

**Step 9: Manage security terms in the cloud service agreement**

Since cloud computing typically involves at least two organizations – customer and provider, the respective security responsibilities of each party must be made clear. This is typically done by means of a cloud service agreement (CSA), which specifies the services provided and the terms of the contract between the customer and the provider. Service agreements for cloud computing are discussed in more detail in the CSCC document *Practical Guide to Cloud Service Agreements* [1] and ISO/IEC 19086-1 standard, *Information technology -- Cloud Computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework -- Part 1: Overview and concepts* [30].
One CSA feature relating to security is that any requirements that are placed on the cloud service provider must also pass on to any peer cloud service providers that the provider may use in order to supply any part of their service(s).

The CSA should explicitly document that providers must notify customers in a timely manner of the occurrence of any breach of their system, regardless of the parties or data directly impacted. The provider should:

- Include specific pertinent information in the notification,
- Stop the data breach as quickly as possible,
- Restore secure access to the service as soon as possible,
- Apply best-practice forensics in investigating the circumstances and causes of the breach, and
- Make long-term infrastructure changes to correct the root causes of the breach and ensure that it does not recur,
- Test the effectiveness of the repair.

Due to the high financial and reputation costs resulting from a breach, customers may want the provider to compensate them if the breach was their fault. An indemnification clause in the contract should not protect the provider from liability in the case of negligence.

Metrics and standards for measuring performance and effectiveness of information security management should be established in advance in the cloud service agreement. At a minimum, customers should understand and document their current metrics, how they will change when operations migrate to the cloud, and where a provider may use different (potentially incompatible) metrics. Refer to the following resources for specific information on security metrics:

- ISO/IEC 19086, Cloud computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework [30]
- CIS Consensus Security Metrics v1.1.0 [17]

Measuring and reporting a provider’s compliance with respect to data protection is a tangible metric of the effectiveness of the overall enterprise security plan. Certification to a suitable standard such as ISO/IEC 27018 is preferable. Otherwise, a data compliance report should be required from the cloud provider, reflecting the strength or weakness of controls, services, and mechanisms supported by the provider in all security domains. Alternatively, the provider should obtain an independent certification of their cloud service against recognized data protection standards.
Finally, one must realize that each cloud service category has distinct responsibilities for the provider and customer:

- In the IaaS model, the onus for securing of and reporting on the infrastructure falls on the provider, but all responsibility for the software stack from the operating system to the application is the responsibility of the customer.\(^5\)
- In the PaaS model, the provider is responsible for securing the infrastructure and platform, and the responsibility of the application lies with the customer.
- In the SaaS model, the provider has responsibility for most aspects of security.

Even in an instance where the provider bears all responsibility, the customer should validate that the provider has instituted the appropriate measures to secure the environment.

**Step 10: Understand the security requirements of the exit process**

The overall need for a well-defined and documented exit process is described in the CSCC *Practical Guide to Cloud Service Agreements*. [1]

From a security perspective, it is important that once the customer has completed the termination process, "reversibility" is achieved - i.e., customer data should not remain with the cloud service provider. The provider must ensure that any copies of the data are permanently erased from their environment, wherever the copies may have been stored (including backup locations as well as online data stores). Note that cloud service derived data held by the provider may need "cleansing" of information relating to the customer (e.g., logs and audit trails), although some jurisdictions may require retention of records of this type for periods specified by law.

Clearly, there is the opposite problem during the exit process itself - the customer must be able to ensure a smooth transition, without loss or breach of data. Thus the exit process must allow the customer to retrieve their data in a suitably secure form, backups must be retained for agreed periods before being eliminated and associated event logs and reporting data must also be retained until the exit process is complete.

---

\(^5\) The cloud provider is responsible for logging and timely data retrieval and provision to the customer in an incident response scenario.
Cloud Security Assessment
The critical questions that cloud customers should ask themselves and their cloud providers during each step of the security assessment are highlighted in Table 6.

### Table 6. Cloud Security Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Step</th>
<th>Assessment Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Ensure effective governance, risk and compliance processes exist          | - What information security and privacy standards or regulations apply to the customer’s domain?  
- Does the customer have governance and compliance processes in place for the use of cloud services?  
- Does the provider have appropriate governance and incident notification processes for their services, consistent with the customer’s requirements?  
- Is it clear what legal and regulatory requirements apply to the provider’s services?  
- What do the Master Services Agreement and Service Level Agreement say about the sharing of security responsibilities between provider and customer?  
- Is there a risk related to data location?                                                                                           |
| 2. Audit and ensure proper reporting of operational and business processes    | - Is a report by an independent audit agency available for covering the provider’s cloud services? Does the audit information conform to one of the accepted standards for security audit such as ISO 27001/27002?  
- Does the provider have mechanisms to report to the customers both routine and exceptional behavior related to its services? Are all appropriate events and actions that have security implications logged?  
- Do the security controls encompass not only the cloud services themselves, but also the management interfaces offered to customers?  
- Is there an Incident Reporting and Incident Handling process that meets the needs of the customer?                                                                 |
| 3. Manage people, roles and identities                                        | - Do the provider services offer fine grained access control?  
- Is multi-factor authentication supported for provider services?  
- Can the provider give reports for monitoring user access?  
- Is it possible to integrate or federate customer identity management systems with the identity management facilities of the provider?                                                                                  |
| 4. Ensure proper protection of data and information                            | - Is there a catalog of all data assets that will be used or stored in the cloud environment?  
- Is there a description of responsible parties and roles?  
- Has the handling of all forms of data been considered, in particular unstructured data such as images?  
- For structured data held in databases in a multi-tenant cloud environment, is there proper separation of data belonging to different customers?  
- Have appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and availability measures been applied to data used or stored in the cloud?                                                                 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Step</th>
<th>Assessment Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5. Enforce privacy policies         | ● Is PII going to be stored/processed by the cloud services?  
● What data protection laws and regulations apply, given the industry and the locations in which the customer operates or the locations where the provider stores the data?  
● Do the provider's services have appropriate controls in place for handling PII?  
● Are responsibilities for handling PII stated in the cloud service agreement?  
● Are there appropriate data residency restrictions in the Cloud Service Agreement?  
● If there is a data breach, are responsibilities for reporting and resolving the breach clear, including priorities and timescales? |
| 6. Assess the security provisions for cloud applications | ● Based on the cloud model used, is it clear who has responsibility for the security of the applications (customer or provider)?  
● If it is the customer, does he have policies and methodologies in place to ensure the appropriate security controls for each application?  
● If it is the provider, does the cloud service agreement make its responsibilities clear and require specific security controls to be applied to the application?  
● In either case, does the application make use of appropriate encryption techniques to protect the data and the user’s transactions? |
| 7. Ensure cloud networks and connections are secure | ● Is network traffic screening possible?  
● What ability does the provider have to deal with denial of service attacks?  
● Does the provider's network have intrusion detection & prevention in place?  
● Does the network provide the customer with logging and notification?  
● Is separation of network traffic possible in a shared multi-tenant provider environment?  
● Is customer network access separated from provider network access? |
| 8. Evaluate security controls on the physical infrastructure and facilities | ● Can the cloud service provider demonstrate appropriate security controls applied to their physical infrastructure and facilities?  
● Does the service provider have facilities in place to ensure continuity of service in the face of environmental threats or equipment failures?  
● Does the cloud service provider have necessary security controls on their human resources? |
| 9. Manage security terms in the cloud service agreement | ● Does the cloud service agreement specify security responsibilities of the provider and of the customer?  
● Does the service agreement require that all security terms must also pass down to any peer cloud service providers used by the provider?  
● Does the service agreement have metrics for measuring performance and effectiveness of security management?  
● Does the service agreement explicitly document procedures for notification and handling of security incidents? |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Step</th>
<th>Assessment Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Understand the security requirements of the</td>
<td>● Is there a documented exit process as part of the cloud service agreement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exit process</td>
<td>● Is it clear that all cloud service customer data is deleted from the provider’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environment at the end of the exit process?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Is cloud service customer data protected against loss or breach during the exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>process?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Works Cited


[10] DMTF Cloud Audit Data Federation (CADF) http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cadf


http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/

https://www.iso.org/standard/64120.html


[17] CIS Consensus Security Metrics v1.1.0
https://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/downloads/metrics/

http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf

[20] Medical Practitioners' Law
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/official_gazette/pdf/19480730f_eb.00000.010.010_0010.0010.0_a.127600.01217100.pdf

[21] Law on Public Health Nurses, Midwives and Nurses
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/official_gazette/pdf/19480730f_eb.00000.010.010_0010.0010.0_a.127600.01217100.pdf

[22] Dentist Law
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/official_gazette/pdf/19480730f_eb.00000.010.010_0010.0010.0_a.127600.01217100.pdf

[23] Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/

[24] Law for the Protection of Personal Data (LPDP), Law No. 25.326 - see

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/chapter-2/subchapter-I

[26] Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/usc.cgi?ACTION=RETRIEVE&FILE=__$x$a__$busc18.wais&start=3919965&SIZE=21304&TYPE=TEXT
[27] HIPAA Regulations & Modifications

[28] Fair Credit Reporting Act
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcradoc.pdf

[29] Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ102/content-detail.html

https://www.iso.org/standard/67545.html

[31] ISO/IEC 19086 Cloud computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework -- Part 4: Security and privacy
https://www.iso.org/standard/68242.html

[32] EU Cloud Code of Conduct
https://eucoc.cloud/en/home/

[33] Cloud Assurance Assessor Program (CAAP)
https://www.hispi.org/CAAP.php

http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/cloud-customer-architecture-for-securing-workloads-on-cloud-services.htm

http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/data-residency-challenges.htm

[36] Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) specification
https://www.hl7.org/fhir/overview.html

https://www.iso.org/standard/62816.html

[38] ISO/IEC 19941 Cloud Computing -- Interoperability and Portability
https://www.iso.org/standard/66639.html

Additional References


Cloud Standards Customer Council (2016). *Public Cloud Service Agreements: What to Expect and What to Negotiate.*

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/security-guidance/

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/ccm/
## Appendix A: Distinctions Between Security and Privacy

This Appendix highlights noteworthy distinctions between security and privacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Privacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main concerns</strong></td>
<td>Of a technical nature:</td>
<td>Of a legal/regulatory nature:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Integrity of systems</td>
<td>• Unauthorized access to personally identifiable information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preventing unauthorized access to systems</td>
<td>• Tampering or deletion of personal information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Availability of service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential impacts</strong></td>
<td>• Extended outages, resulting in the inability to conduct business</td>
<td>• Violation of a person’s rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Destruction of data or systems</td>
<td>• Lawsuits from affected individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Direct loss of business due to outages, manipulation or destruction</td>
<td>• Denial of services or benefits to a person (e.g., refusal to hire or to provide insurance based on private medical or judicial information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Business impact due to confidential information becoming public</td>
<td>• Reputation damage with direct impact on business (privacy breaches result in media exposure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reputation damage (although security failures tend to remain secret)</td>
<td>• Violation of regulations or laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perpetrators</strong></td>
<td>• Malicious agents intent on causing harm, ranging from “script kiddies” to “hacktivists,” industrial spies, terrorists, and foreign governments</td>
<td>• Sometimes no one: private information may be revealed accidentally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sometimes a “hacktivist” intent on proving that an organization does not protect data correctly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sometimes a domestic intelligence agency trying to capture information deemed important for national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Common criminals looking to steal identities, credentials, credit card numbers, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivations</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Range from demonstrating the lack of security to actually causing harm</td>
<td>• Range from demonstrating the lack of privacy to stealing private information for profit to malicious intent, to damaging the reputation of the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible measures and tools</td>
<td>• Intrusion detection</td>
<td>• Encrypting the data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Perimeter hardening and defense in depth (multiple firewalls, antivirus software, strict need-to-know access control)</td>
<td>• Vetting of personnel with access to PII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Offering a less visible profile by moving to the cloud</td>
<td>• Strong Identity and access management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information security policy</td>
<td>• “Split-and-spread”: making the data accessible at any one site incomplete until reassembled in a highly trusted system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix B: Worldwide Privacy Regulations

The state of privacy regulations around the world varies quite rapidly. Any snapshot of this situation, such as provided below, should be reviewed periodically by the user.

Generally, privacy regulations may cover the following aspects:

- The scope of what is protected
- The entities to which the regulations apply
- The rules about allowing the transfer of protected data to other countries
- Whether the country’s rules provide “safe harbor” status with respect to the stringent European Union laws on data residency
- Whether there is a data protection agency of the government that has special jurisdiction over data privacy (as is the case for example with the CNIL commission in France)
- What special rights the Government gives itself to perform surveillance based on accessing data or obtaining encryption keys
- Whether there is an overriding protection contained in the country’s constitution or other statutes.

---

6 This list is derived from the Forrester Global Data Protection Heat Map. See [http://www.forrestertools.com/heatmap/](http://www.forrestertools.com/heatmap/)

Copyright © 2017 Cloud Standards Customer Council
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Asia Pacific region, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and others | • Some countries have enacted data protection laws that require the data controller to adopt reasonable technical, physical, and administrative measures in order to protect personal data from loss, misuse, or alteration, based on the Privacy and Security Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [18], and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) Privacy Framework.  
• China, Taiwan and Thailand have effectively no data protection regime.  
• Malaysia and India have some limited protections.  
• South Korea and Singapore have the most stringent privacy regulations of the region. In Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 is enforced by the Personal Data Commission established in 2013. |
| Japan                                                         | • In Japan, the Personal Information Protection Act [19] requires the private sectors to protect personal information and data securely. In the healthcare industry, profession-specific laws such as the Medical Practitioners’ Law [20], the Law on Public Health Nurses, Midwives and Nurses [21], and the Dentist Law [22] require registered health professionals to protect the confidentiality of patient information. |
| Europe                                                        | • The European Union has adopted a stringent General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that superseded the 1995 Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and the 2002 ePrivacy Directive (as amended in 2009). These regulations include a security component, and the obligation to provide adequate security must be passed down to subcontractors.  
• Even within the European Union, there are differences in local laws and regulations. The Benelux countries, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia have the strictest rules. France has had a data privacy law since 1978, enforced by a special government commission (CNIL), with which any new database containing PII must be registered. |
<p>| Africa, Middle East                                           | • Other countries that have close ties with the European Union, such as Morocco and Tunisia in Africa, or Israel and Dubai in the Middle East, have adopted similar laws that follow the same principles as the EU GDPR. Turkey, by contrast, has minimal restrictions, a situation that is likely to change if and when the country is admitted into the EU. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Americas | • Laws across the continent place on the data custodian the burden of ensuring the protection and security of personal data wherever the data is located, and especially when transferring to a third party.  
• In addition to the data protection laws of Canada [23] and Argentina [24], which have been in existence for several years, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Peru have recently passed data protection laws that are inspired mainly from the European model and may also include references to the APEC Privacy Framework.  
• Argentina is the strictest of the hemisphere’s countries and the combination of its constitutional protection and laws have earned it recognition by the European Union that it provides equivalent protection.  
• In Mexico, the “transparency laws” enacted in order to fight corruption can work at cross-purposes with privacy. For example, any civil servant’s name and professional e-mail address is exposed to the public because the law requires the employee directories of all government agencies to be public. On the other hand, data held by the private sector is protected under a series of laws enacted in 2010-2014, and the situation is still changing. Data residency restrictions are often invoked as an obstacle against moving to cloud solutions, even though it is hard to pinpoint any text that explicitly imposes data residency within Mexico.  
• Paraguay is the exception in the continent, with essentially no restrictions. |
In addition to privacy-specific regulations, customers should review data residency laws and regulations that may constrain the offshore storage and transfer of sovereign data (e.g., data about natural

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| United States | • There is no single privacy law in the Unites States. A range of government agency and industry sector laws impose privacy obligations in specific circumstances. There are numerous gaps and overlaps in coverage. Current industry sector privacy laws include:  
  o The Federal Trade Commission Act [25], which prohibits unfair or deceptive practices - this requirement has been applied to company privacy policies in several prominent cases.  
  o The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 [26], which protects customers against interception of their electronic communication (with numerous exceptions).  
  o The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [27], which contains privacy rules applying to certain categories of health and medical research data.  
  o The Fair Credit Reporting Act [28], which includes privacy rules for credit reporting and customer reports.  
  o The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) [29], which governs the collection, disclosure, and protection of customers’ nonpublic personal information for financial institutions. |

These laws hold organizations responsible for the acts of their subcontractors. For example, GLBA and HIPAA require that organizations compel their subcontractors, in written contracts, to use reasonable security measures and comply with data privacy provisions. U.S. Government agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the State Attorneys General, have consistently held organizations liable for the activities of their subcontractors.

• California has progressively reinforced its laws concerning data breaches, as recently as September 2014. It also enacted at the same time the Student Online Personal Information Protection Act (SOPIPA).

| Worldwide | • The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards (DSS) [8], which apply to credit card data anywhere in the world, including data processed by subcontractors, has similar requirements. |
resources, data belonging to central or local governments, etc.). See the CSCC’s white paper on Data Residency Challenges. [35]

Appendix C: Acronyms & Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AICPA</td>
<td>American Institute of Certified Public Accountants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAP</td>
<td>Cloud Assurance Assessor Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Cloud Security Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoBIT</td>
<td>Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>A framework created by ISACA to support governance of IT by defining and aligning business goals with IT goals and IT processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Cloud Standards Customer Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDos</td>
<td>Distributed Denial of Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Denial of Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENISA</td>
<td>European Network and Information Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Federal Trade Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLBA</td>
<td>Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPR</td>
<td>General Data Protection Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPAA</td>
<td>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPI</td>
<td>Holistic Information Security Practitioner Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IaaS</td>
<td>Infrastructure as a Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>International Electrotechnical Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPS</td>
<td>Intrusion Protection System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISACA</td>
<td>Information Systems Audit and Control Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Standards Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PaaS</td>
<td>Platform as a Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Payment Card Industry (Security Standards Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>Personally identifiable information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SaaS</td>
<td>Software as a Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>Service Level Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSAE</td>
<td>Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>